Matching and Prices by Alex Teytelboym

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Autumn Term 2022.

Alex Teytelboym from the Department of Economics, University of Oxford will present their research on Matching and Prices.

Abstract

Indivisibilities and budget constraints are pervasive features of many matching markets. But when taken together, these features typically cause failures of gross substitutability—a standard condition on preferences imposed in most matching models. To accommodate budget constraints and other income effects, we analyze matching markets under a weaker condition: net substitutability. Although competitive equilibria do not generally exist in our setting, we show that stable outcomes always exist and are efficient. However, standard auctions and matching procedures, such as the Deferred Acceptance algorithm and the Cumulative Offer process, do not generally yield stable outcomes. We illustrate how the flexibility of prices is critical for our results. We also dis- cuss how budget constraints and other income effects affect classic properties of stable outcomes.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 24 October 2022 at 4pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.