Matching with Costly Interviews: The Benefits of Asynchronous Offers by Akhil Vohra

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Autumn Term 2023.

Akhil Vohra, from the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia, will present their research on Matching with Costly Interviews: The Benefits of Asynchronous Offers. 

Abstract

In many matching markets, matches are formed after costly interviews. We analyze the welfare implications of costly interviewing in a model of worker-firm matching. We use our model to understand the trade-offs between a centralized matching system and a decentralized one, where matches can occur at any time. Centralized matching with a common offer date leads to coordination issues in the interview stage. Each firm must incorporate the externality imposed by the interview decisions of the firms ranked above it when deciding on its interview list. As a result, low-ranked firms often fail to interview some candidates that ex-ante have high match quality. A decentralized setting with exploding offers generates, at a minimum, the same welfare as the centralized setting, though the set of candidates who receive interviews is different. Total welfare is generally maximized with a system that ensures firms interview and match in sequence, clearing the market for the next firm. Such asynchronicity reduces interview congestion. This system can be implemented by encouraging top firms to interview and match early and allowing candidates to renege on offers.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 4 December 2023 at 3.30pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.