(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities by Rakesh Vohra

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2024.

Rakesh Vohra, from the Department of Economics & Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, will present their research on (Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities.

Abstract

An obstacle to using market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods (such as courses to students) is the non-existence of competitive equilibria (CE). To surmount this, Arrow and Hahn proposed the notion of social-approximate equilibria: a price vector and corresponding excess demands that are `small'. We identify a class of preferences called D-substitutes, and show that social approximate equilibria where the bound on excess demand, good-by-good, is 2(D-1) independent of the size of the economy. When D=1 existence of CE is guaranteed even in the presence of income effects. This sufficient condition strictly generalizes prior conditions.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Tuesday 5 March at 12.00noon. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.