Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication by Roberto Serrano

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2024.

Roberto Serrano, from the Department of Economics at Brown University, will present their research on Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication. 

Abstract

Can evidence or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication frameworks? In a me­diated Bayesian persuasion model with unverifiable evidence, evidence cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the intermediary communicates the evidence, the receiver's expected utility im­proves only with a positive autarky value of the intermediary's private informa­tion (AVIPI), a novel information accuracy measure we propose. Finally, the sender's strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary's presence as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 11 March 2024 at 1.30pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.