Reputation and Information Design by Laurent Mathevet

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2024.

Laurent Mathevet, from the European University Institute, will present their research on Reputation and Information Design.

Abstract

Can reputation replace legal commitment for an institution making periodic announcements? Near the limiting case of ideal patience, results of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) imply a positive answer in value terms. However, because little is known about equilibrium behavior in dynamic reputational models, the classical dynamic foundation for commitment in Bayesian persuasion is incomplete. Computational and analytic approaches are combined here to characterize equilibrium behavior in a dynamic reputational cheap talk model. Behavior depends upon which of three reputational regions pertains after a history of play. These characterizations hold even far from the patient limit. But combined with a novel method of calculating average discounted values, they allow us to show behavioral convergence toward the static Bayesian persuasion solution.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Wednesday 1 May 2024 at 2.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.