From Design to Disclosure by Andreas Kleiner

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2024.

Andreas Kleiner, from the Department of Economics at University of Bonn, will present their research on From Design to Disclosure.

Abstract

This paper studies voluntary disclosure in sender-receiver games in which the sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. Our framework encompasses monopoly pricing, bargaining over policies, and insurance markets. In this setting, we characterize the full set of equilibrium payoffs. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported in an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, in the contracting environments that we study, our analysis offers a microfoundation for information design and suggests that the gap between information design and disclosure is negligible.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 10 June 2024 at 2.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.