Information Aggregation with Sequential Voting by Dimitrios Xefteris

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Autumn Term 2024.

Dimitrios Xefteris, from the Department of Economics at University of Cyprus, will present their research on Information Aggregation with Sequential Voting.

Abstract

When truth-seeking agents take turns and vote sequentially on a binary issue (e.g. support a reform, oppose it, or abstain), they can base their decisions both on their private information and on the actions taken by others before them. As we show, this allows the group not only to aggregate information more effectively than if votes were cast simultaneously, but, perhaps surprisingly, to achieve the highest possible efficiency level (i.e. to reach full information equivalence) even when voters differ in the precision of the information they possess.      

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Tuesday 1 October 2024 at 2.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.