Strategic Voting when Winning is Not All by Dimitrios Xefteris

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Autumn Term 2024.

Dimitrios Xefteris, from the Department of Economics at University of Cyprus, will present their research on Strategic Voting when Winning is Not All.

Abstract

We study multi-candidate one-person-one-vote elections where voters care about the full ranking of the candidates, not just the winner.

We show that: a) perhaps surprisingly, equilibrium analysis remains tractable despite multiple pivotal events, and b) the simplifying winner-takes-all assumption creates a discontinuity in equilibrium predictions: When voters care predominantly, but not only, about the winner, the traditional result that plurality rule is necessarily conductive to a two-party system breaks down.

Indeed, unless coordination can generate a sufficiently competitive two-horse race, more than two candidates end up receiving positive vote shares in equilibrium, making predictions align more closely with empirical regularities.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Tuesday 1 October 2024 at 2.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.