Lobbying Executive Agencies

Seminar summary

We find that 80% of companies that lobby Congress also lobby executive agencies. Although executive agencies are not beholden to companies for campaign contributions, the agencies are nevertheless influenced by lobbying: companies’ lobbying leads to more favourable rules, more special exemptions, more government contracts, and more favourable decisions on enforcement actions. Agencies’ bestowment of favours appears to be motivated by opportunities within the private sector: lobbying activities are concentrated within agencies that have closer revolving door relations with the private sector. Following a negative exogenous shock to agency power, the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, firms engaged in agency lobbying experienced negative abnormal returns, underscoring the strategic value of lobbying agencies.

How to join this seminar

We welcome you to join us online on Wednesday 6 November 2024 at 1pm.

This seminar is free to attend. Please contact Dr Anna Sarkisyan for the zoom link.

Speaker bio

Ekaterina Volkova

Ekaterina Volkova is an Associate Professor in the Department of Finance at the University of Melbourne. Her research primarily focuses on corporate governance and the regulation of publicly traded companies. Ekaterina’s work has been published in several journals, including the Journal of Finance, the Review of Financial Studies, and Management Science. Prior to joining the University of Melbourne, Ekaterina received her PhD from Cornell University, a M. A. degree in Economics from the New Economic School, and a M.S. degree in Mathematics from Moscow State University.