Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Autumn Term 2024.
Chiara Margaria, from Boston University, will present their research on Knowledge Transfers.
Abstract
We propose a parsimonious principal-agent model to study the dynamics of knowledge transfers. We show that the principal has incentives to withhold knowledge, deliberately slowing down the pace of training in the initial phases to strengthen the agent's incentives to exert effort early on, even if this comes at the cost of delaying the time when the agents the task is hired to work on, and hence the time when profits are collected. Our model provides a strategic rationale for why identical workers may accumulate different levels of human capital when employed by different firms. Unlike models where the principal provides general human capital, this result does not stem from the fact that the agent's outside option increases over time but solely from the dynamic moral hazard problem problem. Perhaps surprisingly, commitment has no value, as the principal can achieve her commitment payoff in the best equilibrium of the game. However, this equilibrium may not necessarily be Markov in the agent's stock of knowledge.
This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 2 December at 4.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.
To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.
This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.