Strategic Attribute Learning by Ludmila Matysková

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2025.

Ludmila Matysková, from the University of Alicante, will present this week's Microeconomics Seminar on Strategic Attribute Learning.

Abstract

A researcher allocates a budget of informative tests across multiple unknown attributes to influence a decision-maker. We derive the researcher's equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute weights in this problem depend on how much the researcher and the decision-maker disagree. If the researcher expects an excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager favors more diverse analysts as the hierarchical distance grows. In another application, we show how an appropriately opposed advisor can constrain a discriminatory politician, and identify the welfare-inequality Pareto frontier of researchers.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Monday 17 February at 2.00pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.