Dr Carmine Ventre
![Dr Carmine Ventre](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/VENTR89804.jpg)
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Email
c.ventre@essex.ac.uk -
Location
1NW.3.17, Colchester Campus
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Academic support hours
Thu 10-12 or by appointment
Profile
Biography
Carmine Ventre is a reader in CSEE. After gaining a summa cum laude Laurea in Computer Science degree (BSc plus MSc equivalent) he began PhD research in 2003 and was awarded his PhD in 2007, defending a thesis on theoretical advances in the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms. Subsequently, he took post-doctoral research positions in Italy at first and later at the University of Liverpool working on proposals funded by EU, DFG and EPSRC. He has been a lecturer first and a reader then at Teesside University between 2012 and 2016. He joined Essex in December 2016. Carmine is author of more than 50 refereed articles in Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) and Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), having published in world leading conferences and journals of Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Economics. He has received the best paper prize award at the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013) for his work on mechanism design for combinatorial auctions. He is very active in the international research community, has sat on the program committees of several conferences and for the past few years has been involved with the organization of AGT@IJCAI, an annual AGT workshop held at one of the top AI venues.
Qualifications
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PhD in Computer Science Università degli Studi di Salerno,
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Laurea (MSc equiv) Università degli Studi di Salerno,
Appointments
University of Essex
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Director of CCFEA, University of Essex (1/12/2016 - present)
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Ethics officer, CSEE, University of Essex (1/8/2017 - present)
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Reader, CSEE, University of Essex (1/12/2016 - present)
Other academic
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Reader, Teesside University (1/1/2012 - 30/11/2016)
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Research associate, University of Liverpool (1/12/2007 - 31/12/2011)
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Assegnista di ricerca, Università degli Studi di Salerno (1/9/2006 - 30/11/2007)
Research and professional activities
Research interests
Algorithmic Game Theory; Algorithms and Complexity; Cryptography and security; AI for finance and trading
Teaching and supervision
Previous supervision
![Chen Chen](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/CHENC66900.jpg?mh=60&)
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 23/12/2022
![Amer Bakhach](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/BAKHA01004.jpg?mh=60&)
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 6/12/2018
![Ran Tao](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/TAORA00902.jpg?mh=60&)
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 5/11/2018
![Jorge Faleiro](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/FALEI29507.jpg?mh=60&)
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 24/8/2018
![Shengnan Li](http://www1.essex.ac.uk/people-images/LISHE00904.jpg?mh=60&)
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Master of Science (by Dissertation)
Awarded date: 23/1/2018
Publications
Journal articles (28)
Fang, F., Chung, W., Ventre, C., Basios, M., Kanthan, L., Li, L. and Wu, F., (2024). Ascertaining price formation in cryptocurrency markets with machine learning. The European Journal of Finance. 30 (1), 78-100
Li, H., Xiao, Y., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2024). Thermodynamic Analysis of Financial Markets: Measuring Order Book Dynamics with Temperature and Entropy. Entropy. 26 (1), 24-24
Ferraioli, D., Meier, A., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2023). New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. Mathematics of Operations Research. 48 (1), 332-362
Ioannidis, SD., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2023). Financial networks with singleton liability priorities. Theoretical Computer Science. 963, 113965-113965
Kwang-Hua, CR., Li, H-C., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C. and Li, Z-H., (2022). Note on electron energy can oscillate near a crystal dislocation. Physica B: Condensed Matter. 632, 413766-413766
Fang, F., Ventre, C., Basios, M., Kanthan, L., Martinez-Rego, D., Wu, F. and Li, L., (2022). Cryptocurrency trading: a comprehensive survey. Financial Innovation. 8 (1)
Black, E., Brandão, M., Cocarascu, O., De Keijzer, B., Du, Y., Long, D., Luck, M., McBurney, P., Meroño-Peñuela, A., Miles, S., Modgil, S., Moreau, L., Polukarov, M., Rodrigues, O. and Ventre, C., (2022). Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence. AI Communications. 35 (4), 309-325
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2021). Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. Algorithmica. 83 (2), 695-725
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms. 15 (2), 1-42
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theoretical Computer Science. 795, 345-361
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 62, 459-488
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. Theoretical Computer Science. 745, 150-162
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2017). Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica. 77 (3), 756-785
Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2016). Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theoretical Computer Science. 648, 96-115
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science. 636, 27-46
Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theoretical Computer Science. 571 (C), 21-35
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 53, 721-744
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games and Economic Behavior. 86, 491-509
Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2014). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM Journal on Computing. 43 (4), 1263-1290
Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 518, 64-79
Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2013). On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. International Journal of Game Theory. 42 (4), 1059-1083
Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2013). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theoretical Computer Science. 476, 24-37
Briest, P., Gualà, L., Hoefer, M. and Ventre, C., (2012). On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. Networks. 60 (1), 31-44
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2012). Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ACM Transactions on Computation Theory. 4 (2), 1-17
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 200-216
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). A response to “Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle”. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 224-224
Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2009). Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 410 (8-10), 886-899
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 3104, 255-266
Books (2)
(2023). PRIMA 2022: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. Springer International Publishing. 9783031212024
(2022). Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing. 9783031157134
Book chapters (1)
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2008). Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 708- 719. 9783540877431
Conferences (82)
Culley, C., Qi, J. and Ventre, C., How to get the most from goods donated to charities (Extended abstract)
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation (Extended abstract)
Hoefer, M., Ventre, C. and Wilhelmi, L., (2024). Algorithms for Claims Trading
Tong, J., De Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2024). Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks through Donations
Braga, P., Abstract, E., Krysta, P., Leonardos, S., Piliouras, G. and Ventre, C., (2024). Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism
Archbold, T., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2024). Willy Wonka Mechanisms
Qi, J. and Ventre, C., (2023). Accounting for Strategic Response in Limit Order Book Dynamics
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality
Thorburn, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Error in the Euclidean Preference Model
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Archbold, T., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2023). Non-Obviously Manipulable Mechanism Design for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade
Archbold, T., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2023). Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents
Thorburn, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Error in the Euclidean Preference Model
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness
Zhao, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks
Li, H., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools
WANG, Z., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2023). Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2022). Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation
Ferraioli, D., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2022). Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
Ioannidis, SD., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2022). Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives
Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L., Kanthan, L., Wu, F. and Basios, M., (2022). The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets
Zhu, Y. and Ventre, C., (2022). Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation
Alden, A., Ventre, C., Horvath, B. and Lee, G., (2022). Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures
Qi, J. and Ventre, C., (2022). Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets
Ma, Y., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2022). Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning
Liu, C., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2022). Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading
Ioannidis, SD., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2022). Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities
Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L. and Kanthan, L., (2021). Call markets with adaptive clearing intervals
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2021). Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring
Gong, Z., Ventre, C. and O'Hara, J., (2021). The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks
Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L. and Kanthan, L., (2021). Agent-based markets
Serafino, P., Ventre, C. and Vidali, A., (2020). Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring
De Keijzer, B., Kyropoulou, M. and Ventre, C., (2020). Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions
Ferraioli, D., Meier, A., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2020). Novel paradigm for the design of obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Gong, Z., Ventre, C. and O'Hara, J., (2020). Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model
Kyropoulou, M. and Ventre, C., (2019). Obviously strategyproof mechanisms without money for scheduling
Culley, C., Qi, J. and Ventre, C., (2019). How to get the most from goods donated to charities
Kyropoulou, M., Ventre, C. and Zhang, X., (2019). Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location
Serafino, P., Ventre, C., Tran-Thanh, L., Zhang, J., An, B. and Jennings, N., (2019). Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation
Ferraioli, D., Meier, A., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2019). Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems
Serafino, P., Ventre, C. and Vidali, A., (2019). Truthfulness on a budget: Trading money for approximation through monitoring
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms (Extended abstract)
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for Obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Social Pressure in Opinion Games
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract)
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions
Ferraioli, D., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Truthful mechanisms without money for non-utilitarian heterogeneous facility location
Ferraioli, D., Ventre, C. and Aranyi, G., (2015). A mechanism design approach to measure awareness
Kovács, A., Meyer, U. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Near-optimal approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Cascade model with contextual externalities and bounded user memory for sponsored search auctions
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2015). Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Heterogeneous facility location without money on the line
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Combinatorial Auctions without money
Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2013). Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2013). Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2012). Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games
Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2011). On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games
Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2010). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization
Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable
Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Gualà, L. and Ventre, C., (2009). On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2009). Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2009). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2008). Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2008). Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2008). Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2006). New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
Ventre, C., (2006). Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2006). The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2006). Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: Combining MSTs with shortest-path trees
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks
Grants and funding
2019
Intra-document analysis that lead to profit and performance optimisation
Stephenson Harwood
2017
Incentives without monetary transfers
Engineering & Physical Sciences Res.Council
The project investigates the use of algorithms (genetic + reinforcement) to provide accurate forecasts of asset prices.
Innovate UK (formerly Technology Strategy Board)
Contact
Academic support hours:
Thu 10-12 or by appointment