The ‘right to legal aid’ and the scope of the project
Legal aid is a relatively recent development for most legal systems. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a useful starting point: Article 7 proclaims a universal right to equality before the law and its protection, without discrimination. The same right is reaffirmed in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In criminal cases, the right to free legal aid is guaranteed (subject to certain conditions) by Article 6 § 3 (c) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
In non-criminal proceedings, the right to legal aid is derived from Article 6 (1) of the ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, as the European Court of Human Rights summarises the point in its Guide on Article 6, Article 6 § 1 does not imply that the State must provide free legal aid for every dispute relating to a ‘civil right’ (Airey v. Ireland, § 26). Legal aid is generally subject to a financial means and merits test. States can decide whether it is in the interest of justice to provide legal aid, taking into account, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: the importance of what is at stake for the applicant (Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 61; P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, § 100); the complexity of the relevant law or procedure (Airey v. Ireland, § 24); the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself effectively (McVicar v. the United Kingdom, §§ 48-62; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 61); the existence of a statutory requirement to have legal representation (Airey v. Ireland § 26; Gnahoré v. France, § 41).
These criteria, which are firmly established in the European legal tradition, reveal, firstly, the significance of free legal aid for a truly effective access to justice for all; and, secondly, how a blanket exclusion of certain types of civil disputes from a legal aid scheme (without a rigorous enforcement of the above criteria) can be devastating for certain individuals, social groups, and the administration of justice per se. By studying the effects of LASPO on family law cases, which usually constitute the average person’s most common engagement with the justice system, we can shed light on several important questions regarding self-representation, access to legal aid, and the possibly disproportionate impact on disadvantaged population groups, including those under financial strain. We use regression discontinuity to investigate the causal impact of LASPO in these areas.